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ABSTRACT 
 Hospitals throughout the United States are facing overcrowding every day, with 
more patients than available staff and space can accommodate, yet current disaster 
response policy related to managing a surge of patients does not include considerations 
for this daily challenge. This thesis investigates the questions that need to be answered 
regarding the foundational principles of current U.S. surge policy and how healthcare 
coalitions might assist in answering such questions. A gap analysis of current healthcare 
coalition policy related to surge was completed that identified the need for policy makers 
to continue to expand the role of evidence-based decision making for surge policy. As a 
result, this thesis recommends that additional data points be added for hospitals receiving 
patients during the required annual coalition surge test-related performance measures for 
healthcare coalitions. The additional data points are designed to help policy makers 
determine whether overcrowding impacts surge response, so policy can be adjusted if 
needed. 
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Generally, healthcare emergency preparedness strategies have revolved around 
major medical disasters or catastrophic-event surge planning. Leaders throughout the 
emergency preparedness and management continuum―including the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) with the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Hospital Preparedness Program 
(HPP), Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), and hospital-accrediting 
bodies, such as the Joint Commission―all recommend the same nationally accepted 
strategies and tactics to address disaster surge events. However, they do not explicitly 
consider the role that daily challenges, such as overcrowding and the baseline capacity 
(defined within this thesis as the beds, staff, and resources available at the onset of an event 
prior to the implementation of any surge measures) of the hospital, may have on the 
organization’s response capabilities for both major and minor events.  
Experts disagree about the extent of the relationship between overcrowding and 
disaster response, which has resulted in two firm, yet divergent viewpoints. One school of 
thought asserts that very real consequences do result, as disaster response capabilities 
diminish with hospital overcrowding. This side makes broad factual claims as if the 
conclusion is common sense. The opposing school of thought claims that daily 
overcrowding has little to no impact on disaster response abilities. This side often points to 
tried-and-true surge planning recommendations and response actions from previous events, 
such as the Boston Marathon bombing or the Orlando Pulse Nightclub shooting. However, 
while those incidents are examples of successful medical responses, little supporting 
evidence is available that documents what the baseline capabilities were within the 
receiving hospitals at the onset of the events. Furthermore, those examples are of relatively 
small and short-term events during which traditional healthcare surge planning models may 
have sufficed regardless of baseline capacities. The bottom line is that current doctrine 
embraces both sides of the argument as fact even though very little supporting evidence 
exists to validate either claim, which has resulted in a very specific yet significant 
knowledge gap. 
xvi 
Despite this knowledge gap, U.S. surge policy continues to be based on 
assumptions in lieu of evidence. This thesis argues that a need exists to formulate national 
policy that is evidence-based. Only when the data is available and analyzed, can 
policymakers truly direct strategies and tactics to make the most impact on disaster 
response capabilities. This research provides an argument that an opportunity exists for 
HHS and its Hospital Preparedness Program to determine the impact of daily overcrowding 
on disaster response. This thesis poses two primary research questions, what are the 
questions surrounding surge capacity and crisis response in healthcare settings and how 
can healthcare coalitions be leveraged to provide data to answer the questions? 
Specifically, how can healthcare coalitions gather data to assist in assessing the efficacy of 
surge capacity targets and in determining if overcrowding impacts disaster response?  
Five main components comprise the research design for this thesis. Chapter II lays 
the foundation by exploring the current state of the overcrowding crisis and delves into 
some of roots and side effects of the crisis. Chapter III explains hospital surge and surge 
capacity and describes the specific strategies and tactics of the current U.S. surge policy. 
One hospital’s response to the Boston Marathon bombing is provided as an example of 
how surge strategies are implemented following disasters. It concludes with lingering 
questions that exist regarding the current surge policy. Chapter IV discusses the HPP’s 
Healthcare Coalitions and provides insight into their federally prescribed roles and 
responsibilities with a focus on capabilities and performance measures related to surge 
capacity creation and disaster response. How coalitions may be leveraged to answer the 
lingering surge questions are also discussed in Chapter IV. Next, a quality improvement 
technique is employed in Chapter V to review current federal surge policy for healthcare 
coalitions by utilizing a gap analysis method as described in Jeffery Harrison’s Essentials 
of Strategic Planning in Healthcare. Finally, Chapter VI focuses on providing conclusions 
on how to fill the policy gaps identified in Chapter V and offers recommendations on how 
healthcare coalitions can assist in answering the questions related to whether overcrowding 
affects hospital disaster response capabilities. The final chapter also identifies future 
research opportunities that have surfaced during the development of this thesis. 
xvii 
This thesis recommends that the HPP program leaders use the wealth of resources 
and expertise within the 476 healthcare coalitions across the country, including the 31,000-
member organizations, to take the opportunity to assess U.S. surge policy critically. These 
stakeholders possess a vested interest in ensuring the best possible policy exists. 
Furthermore, their frontline status in addressing both the overcrowding crisis and surge 
events, affords them the unique viewpoint to identify gaps in the policy and experience to 
suggest potential solutions. Finally, the network of healthcare coalitions and national 
reporting requirements for performance measures provides an opportunity to gather data 
from across the country, in a method already being utilized through the Coalition Surge 
Test tool and related performance measures.  
This information can be used to make informed and evidence-based policy 
decisions related to surge capacity planning moving forward. If the data suggests that 
overcrowding does affect surge response, future HPP program guidance can be modified 
to include recommended strategies health care coalitions (HCCs) can consider to address 
daily overcrowding issues. For example, HPP guidance may suggest that HCCs begin to 
explore utilizing their pre-existing networks of healthcare providers to implement 
programs, such as mobile integrated health designed to keep non-acute patients out of 
emergency departments and in appropriate levels of care. Conversely, if the data indicates 
that overcrowding does not affect surge response, then HPP leaders can keep the status 
quo; having additional evidence-supported assurance in their currently designed policy. 
xviii 
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At the crossroads of healthcare delivery (and reform) and homeland security 
emergency preparedness lies the disaster.1 
―Heritage Foundation 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Generally, healthcare emergency preparedness strategies have revolved around 
major medical disasters or catastrophic-event surge planning. Leaders throughout the 
emergency preparedness and management continuum―including the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) with the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Hospital Preparedness Program 
(HPP), Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), and hospital-accrediting 
bodies, such as the Joint Commission―all recommend the same nationally accepted 
strategies and tactics to address disaster surge events. When reviewing the healthcare surge 
planning guidance from these organizations, they often use descriptive terms, such as 
“sudden impact,” “widespread,” “prolonged,” or “obscure” to describe the recommended 
planning scenarios, which insinuates that only large-scale or major acute events pose the 
greatest threat to hospitals and the healthcare system.2 However, they do not explicitly 
consider the role that daily challenges, such as overcrowding and the baseline capacity 
(defined within this thesis as the beds, staff, and resources available at the onset of an event 
prior to implementation of any surge measures) of the hospital, may have on the 
organization’s response capabilities for both major and minor events.  
Nevertheless, conflict remains among experts as to the extent of the relationship 
between overcrowding and disaster response, which result in two firm, yet divergent 
                                                 
1 Heritage Foundation, Health Care and Homeland Security: Crossroads of Emergency Response 
(Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/homeland-security/report/health-
care-and-homeland-security-crossroads-emergency-response. 
2 Samantha K. Watson, James W. Rudge, and Richard Coker, “Health Systems’ ‘Surge Capacity’: State 
of the Art and Priorities for Future Research,” Milbank Quarterly 91, no. 1 (March 2013): 78–122, https:// 
doi.org/10.1111/milq.12003. 
2 
viewpoints. One school of thought implies very real consequences do result, as disaster 
response capabilities diminish with hospital overcrowding. This side makes broad factual 
claims as if the conclusion is common sense. The opposing school of thought claims that 
daily overcrowding has little to no impact on disaster response abilities. This side often 
points to tried-and-true surge planning recommendations and response actions from 
previous events, such as the Boston Marathon bombing or the Orlando Pulse Nightclub 
shooting. However, while those incidents are examples of successful medical responses, 
little supporting evidence is available that documents the baseline capabilities within the 
receiving hospitals at the onset of the events. Furthermore, those examples are of relatively 
small- and short-term events during which traditional healthcare surge planning models 
may have sufficed regardless of baseline capacities.3 The results may be much different 
when considering complex mass casualty events like the Las Vegas shooting or more long-
term events catastrophic health events like pandemics or largescale natural disasters like 
Hurricanes Katrina, Harvey, or Irma. The bottom line is that current doctrine embraces 
both sides of the argument as fact even though very little supporting evidence exists to 
validate either claim, which has resulted in a very specific yet significant knowledge gap.  
Despite this knowledge gap, U.S. surge policy continues to move forward largely 
based on assumptions in lieu of evidence. The DHS and HHS have historically 
recommended a surge capacity planning capability target of being able to attain 500 open 
hospital beds per million people rapidly.4 Other disaster planners have suggested that a 
hospital should be prepared to surge up to 20% of its staffed bed capacity during a disaster.5 
The 20% benchmark has long been utilized for healthcare response planning by national 
programs, such as HHS’s Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response’s (ASPR) 
HPP Program, which currently uses it as a key performance measure for its healthcare 
                                                 
3 The size of the event is relative to the size of the facility and its capabilities. 
4 Derek DeLia and Elizabeth Wood, “The Dwindling Supply of Empty Beds: Implications for Hospital 
Surge Capacity,” Health Affairs 27, no. 6 (November 1, 2008): 1688–94, https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.27. 
6.1688. 
5 Welzel et al., “Effect of Hospital Staff Surge Capacity on Preparedness for a Conventional Mass 
Casualty Event,” Western Journal of Emergency Medicine 11, no. 2 (May 2010): 189–196, http://www. 
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2908656/. 
3 
coalitions.6 However, these planning targets also appear to be arbitrarily assigned goals 
that have become standard without a great deal of supporting data to back them up.  
The national programs—from both federal leaders and accrediting bodies—all 
revolve around surge capacity tactics needed to address immediate needs from disaster or 
catastrophic surge events to make beds rapidly available in the hospital.7 The HPP and 
Joint Commission recommend surge tactics, such as immediately opening unstaffed beds 
(thereby increasing staff to patient ratios).8 They also routinely recommend treating 
patients in areas not traditionally utilized as patient areas (halls, meeting rooms, and 
cafeterias) as alternate care areas.9 Furthermore, leaders in these programs often 
recommend cancelling elective surgeries and discharging patients early.10 However, they 
do not suggest solutions that create additional baseline capacity prior to the onset of an 
event, which thereby improves the overcrowding problems that plague hospitals every day.  
This thesis argues that a need exists to formulate an evidence-based national policy. 
Only when the data is available and analyzed, can policymakers truly direct strategies and 
tactics to make the most impact on disaster response capabilities. Leaders throughout the 
emergency preparedness and management continuum should make an effort to form policy 
based on evidence and data, and not conjecture. Ultimately, this research suggests methods 
of gathering data to determine the impact of daily overcrowding on hospital disaster 
responses, and thereby, close the knowledge gap to support a federal policy based on 
quantifiable evidence. 
                                                 
6 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017–2022 Hospital Preparedness 
Program Performance Measures Implementation Guidance (Washington, DC: Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2017), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=802147. 
7 DeLia and Wood, “The Dwindling Supply of Empty Beds,” 1688-94. 
8 Joint Commission Resources, Hospital Requirements (EM Chapter) (Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint 
Commission, 2017). 
9 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017–2022 Health Care 
Preparedness and Response Capabilities (Washington, DC: Department of Health and Human Services, 
2016), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=796991. 
10 DeLia and Wood, “The Dwindling Supply of Empty Beds,” 1688-94. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research aims to provide an argument that an opportunity exists for HHS and 
its HPP to determine the true impact of daily overcrowding on disaster response and 
resiliency. This thesis poses two primary research questions:  
• What are the questions surrounding surge capacity and crisis response in 
healthcare settings?  
• How can healthcare coalitions be leveraged to provide data to answer the 
questions? Specifically, how can healthcare coalitions gather data to assist 
in assessing the efficacy of surge capacity targets and in determining if 
overcrowding impacts disaster response? 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Five main components comprise the research design for this thesis. Chapter II lays 
the foundation by exploring the current state of the overcrowding crisis and delves into 
some of the roots and side effects of the crisis. Chapter III explains hospital surge and surge 
capacity and describes the specific strategies and tactics of the current U.S. surge policy. 
One hospital’s response to the Boston Marathon bombing is provided as an example of 
how surge strategies are implemented following disasters. It concludes with lingering 
questions that exist regarding the current surge policy. Chapter IV discusses the HPP’s 
healthcare coalitions and provides insight into their federally prescribed roles and 
responsibilities with a focus on capabilities and performance measures related to surge 
capacity creation and disaster response. How coalitions may be leveraged to answer the 
lingering surge questions are also discussed in Chapter IV. Next, Chapter V employs a 
quality improvement approach to review current federal surge policy for healthcare 
coalitions by utilizing a three primary gap analysis as described in Jeffery Harrison’s 
Essentials of Strategic Planning in Healthcare. Finally, Chapter VI focuses on providing 
conclusions on how to fill the policy gaps identified in Chapter V and offers 
recommendations on how healthcare coalitions can assist in answering the questions 
related to whether overcrowding affects hospital disaster response capabilities. The final 
5 
chapter also identifies future research opportunities that have surfaced during the 
development of this thesis.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review explores the recent trends in the field by focusing on the key 
concepts related to hospital crowding, surge capacity, disaster response capability, and 
resilience. For this study, the literature indicates two schools of thought related to the 
effects of hospital crowding on disaster response capabilities. One camp posits no 
relationship exists between a hospital’s baseline capacity at the onset of an event and its 
ability to respond to a disaster by asserting that traditional surge capacity planning 
strategies and tactics are sufficient for most disasters. Conversely, the opposing camp 
believes a direct relationship does exist between a hospital’s crowding status and its ability 
to respond to a disaster adequately. Consequently, this literature review investigates and 
evaluates the available research related to both camps. Specifically, the literature review 
concentrates on discovering the availability of quantifiable data supporting either 
argument.  
Additionally, hospital and healthcare system resilience research—as it relates to 
emergency preparedness and response capabilities—is a recently emerging field of study 
that should be considered within this narrative. In demonstrating the importance of this 
area of research, Shuang Zhong et al. states, “Given the critical role of hospitals, the model 
of ‘safe and resilient hospitals’ was promoted as a key component of disaster risk reduction 
planning in the healthcare sector during the 2005 World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction.”11 However, few academic sources on the topic currently exist. This literature 
review examines the current research and identifies gaps for further exploration. 
                                                 
11 Shuang Zhong et al., “Development of Hospital Disaster Resilience: Conceptual Framework and 
Potential Measurement,” Emergency Medicine Journal 31, no. 11 (November 1, 2014): 930, https://doi. 
org/10.1136/emermed-2012-202282.  
6 
1. Hospital Crowding at the Onset of a Disaster Event Affects Disaster 
Response Capabilities 
The crisis of overcrowding in emergency departments (EDs) throughout the United 
States remains well documented and one of the few key concepts in the literature that is 
never disputed.12 The effects of overcrowding, including patient safety and mortality, are 
frequently discussed throughout the literature.13 Practitioners disagree primarily about the 
extent to which the EDs and hospital crowding affect disaster response capabilities.  
Experts frequently assert that crowding has a definite influence on a hospital or 
healthcare system’s ability to respond to a disaster event adequately. The foundational 
argument posited by researchers, such as those at the Heritage Foundation, remains that 
hospital crowding creates a vulnerability because critical resources, such as beds, staff, and 
emergency supplies, are maintained at just-in-time supply levels that offer little capacity to 
surge.14 Essentially, as Jennifer Love et al. claim, the lack of extra staff, beds, and resources 
on a daily basis negatively affects surge response capabilities.15 Nevertheless, authorities 
within the field, such as Robert Cherry and Marcia Trainer, as well as the aforementioned, 
frequently reference only their expert opinion and experience as supporting evidence.16 
They provide neither quantifiable nor reproducible supporting evidence for their claims.  
                                                 
12 Sharoda A. Paul, Madhu C. Reddy, and Christopher J. DeFlitch, “A Systematic Review of 
Simulation Studies Investigating Emergency Department Overcrowding,” Simulation 86, no. 8–9 (August 
1, 2010): 559–71. 
13 Eileen J. Carter, Stephanie M. Pouch, and Elaine L. Larson, “The Relationship between Emergency 
Department Crowding and Patient Outcomes: A Systematic Review,” Journal of Nursing Scholarship 46, 
no. 2 (March 2014): 106–15; Institute of Medicine, Hospital-Based Emergency Care: At the Breaking 
Point (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007), https://doi.org/10.17226/11621. 
14 Heritage Foundation, Health Care and Homeland Security: Crossroads of Emergency Response, 1-
20. 
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Researchers often attribute a hospital or healthcare system’s success following a 
disaster or mass-casualty event to the lack of overcrowding. For example, a report by 
Arthur Kellermann and Kobi Peleg that discusses lessons learned from the Boston 
Marathon bombing states the disaster’s one percent mortality rate was, to a certain extent, 
due to the lack of hospital crowding at the time of the event.17 They explain that the incident 
occurred on a state holiday, and “it is likely that the city’s operating rooms and clinical 
services were running at less than full capacity.”18 Gabor Kellen and others who subscribe 
to this school of thought often describe surge capacity as a continuum ranging from daily 
surge (overcrowding) to catastrophic surge resulting from disaster events.19 However, few 
supporting studies provide objective data, and only one study provides supporting 
quantitative data in a nationwide assessment of level 1 trauma centers.20  
2. Hospital Crowding at the Onset of a Disaster Event Does Not Affect 
Disaster Response Capabilities 
The opposing camp remains adamant that a hospital’s baseline status at the onset 
of a disaster event has no bearing on its ability to surge. John Hick, Joseph Barbera, and 
Gabor Kelen state, “There is a significant difference in a health care facility’s ability to 
accommodate patients on a daily basis compared with when their disaster plans are 
activated, regardless of how many beds are actually occupied at the time.”21 The purveyors 
of this school of thought, such as Samantha Watson, James Rudge, and Richard Coker, 
argue that employing traditional surge capacity planning strategies and tactics, such as 
cancelling elective surgeries, recalling additional staff, and discharging patients early, 
                                                 
17 Arthur L. Kellermann and Kobi Peleg, “Lessons from Boston,” The New England Journal of 
Medicine; Boston 368, no. 21 (May 23, 2013): 1956–57. 
18 Kellermann and Peleg, 1956. 
19 Gabor D. Kelen and James J. Scheulen, “Commentary: Emergency Department Crowding as an 
Ethical Issue,” Academic Emergency Medicine 14, no. 8 (August 1, 2007): 751–54.  
20 Hospital Emergency Surge Capacity: Not Ready for the “Predictable Surprise: Hearing before the 
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sess., May 2008. 
21 John Hick, “Refining Surge Capacity: Conventional, Contingency, and Crisis Capacity,” Disaster 
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quickly create required capacity for disaster response.22 Practitioners often cite a hospital’s 
successful response to a real event, such as the Hennepin County, Minnesota bridge 
collapse, to support this argument.23 Finally, few scholars comment on the influence of 
hospital crowding on disaster response capabilities whatsoever.24 This lack of research may 
indicate that the emergency response capability has not been a priority or concern for 
researchers, that the researchers have not viewed the issue as related to the crowding crisis, 
or that they were simply unaware of the potential link.  
E. DEFINITIONS 
Little consensus exists on defining the terminology used to describe what 
constitutes and emergency and a disaster to include disaster types, surge capacity and its 
components, and even what consists of crowding and overcrowding. Challenges persist to 
pinpoint definitions because multiple variables exist between organizations, as far as 
resource and response capabilities and the size and scope of disasters. Consequently, one 
facility may consider an event a disaster that requires an implementation of surge protocols 
while another may consider the same event a routine occurrence. Variables may include 
the size of the organization, personnel experience, and environment among other factors. 
For example, a small rural hospital with limited staffing, supplies, and experience in trauma 
care might consider a multi-car accident with five victims a disaster requiring the 
implementation of surge capacity while a large level 1 trauma center in a metropolitan area 
might consider the same event a normal daily operation. Furthermore, because of the 
multiple factors associated with disaster size and scope and organizational response 
capabilities, some researchers have sought to stratify or classify some terms further within 
the healthcare emergency management field, which has resulted in various levels of 
definitions for words like disaster or types of surge capacity. Consequently, the following 
definitions are intended to provide consistency and clarification within this thesis.  
                                                 
22 Watson, Rudge, and Coker, “Health Systems’ ‘Surge Capacity,’” 78-122. 
23 Hick, “Refining Surge Capacity,” 123-29. 
24 Nathan R. Hoot and Dominik Aronsky, “Systematic Review of Emergency Department Crowding: 
Causes, Effects, and Solutions,” Annals of Emergency Medicine 52, no. 2 (August 2008): 126–36. 
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• Baseline capacity is the beds, staff, and resources available at the onset of 
an event prior to the implementation of any surge measures. 
• Boarding is the process by which hospitals keep patients who have been 
admitted into the hospital in the ED due to overcrowding on inpatient 
floors.25 
• Disaster definitions vary throughout the literature, but for the purpose of 
this thesis, Merriam Webster’s definition is followed: “a sudden 
calamitous event bringing great damage, loss, or destruction.”26 Eric 
Toner et al. from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health’s 
Center for Health Security consider the need to break down the following 
disaster types that may require different response approaches: 
• Small, mass illness/injury events, such as a “bus crash, tornado, 
multiple shootings, local epidemics/small disease outbreaks”27 
• Large-scale natural disasters like “Hurricanes Maria, Sandy, and 
Katrina; moderate earthquake; large-scale flooding, such as 
Hurricane Harvey”28 
• Complex mass casualty events “for example, large-scale shootings 
(Las Vegas or Orlando) or bombings (Boston Marathon) with many 
victims, mass casualty burn events (Rhode Island nightclub), 
                                                 
25 “Definition of Boarded Patient,” ACEP, accessed August 18, 2017, https://www.acep.org/patient-
care/policy-statements/definition-of-boarded-patient/#sm.00001wproexdc2dfgzbvnaiclgpkv.  
26 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “Definition of Disaster,” accessed August 18, 2017, https://www.merr 
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ience.pdf.  
28 Toner et al., 3. 
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chemical or radiological incidents, limited outbreaks of lethal and 
contagious infectious diseases, such as Ebola or SARS”29 
• Catastrophic health events like “nuclear detonation, large scale 
bioterrorism, severe pandemic, or major earthquake”30 
• Emergency care “encompasses the full continuum of services involved in 
emergency medical care, including EMS, hospital-based emergency and 
trauma care, on-call specialty care, bystander care, and injury prevention 
and control.”31 
• Emergency Medical Services (EMS) describes pre-hospital medical 
services provided by 9-1-1 and emergency responders utilizing ambulance 
or helicopter transportation.32  
• Overcrowding denotes the daily or routine occurrence of demand 
exceeding hospital ED or inpatient capacity not caused by an emergency 
or disaster.33 In many cases, overcrowding is the result of daily surge.34 
Crowding may also be used to meet this definition. 
• Surge capacity “encompasses potential patient beds; available space in 
which patients may be triaged, managed, vaccinated, decontaminated, or 
simply located; available personnel of all types; necessary medications, 
supplies, and equipment; and even the legal capacity to deliver health care 
                                                 
29 Toner et al., 3. 
30 Toner et al., 3.  
31 Institute of Medicine, Hospital-Based Emergency Care, 19.  
32 Institute of Medicine, 81-82. 
33 Watson, Rudge, and Coker, “Health Systems’ ‘Surge Capacity’,” 86-87. 
34 Melissa L. McCarthy, Dominik Aronsky, and Gabor D. Kelen, “The Measurement of Daily Surge 
and Its Relevance to Disaster Preparedness,” Academic Emergency Medicine 13, no. 11 (November 1, 
2006): 1138–41, https://doi.org/10.1197/j.aem.2006.06.046. 
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under situations which exceed authorized capacity.”35 John Hick, Michael 
Christian, and Charles Sprung further classify surge capacity into three 
functional elements.36  
• Conventional surge capacity utilizes “usual patient care spaces, 
resources and practices.”37 
• Contingency surge capacity operates in “adapted areas of the 
facility…including adaptations to standard staffing and resource 
practices to provide functionally equivalent medical care, with 
minimal increase in risk to the patient.”38 
• Crisis surge capacity refers to situations where “significant changes 
to standard staffing and resource practices” is required. This level of 
care “may significantly impact patient morbidity and mortality.”39  
Samantha K. Watson, James W. Rudge, and Richard Coker also further present two 
additional surge capacity classifications:  
• Daily surge capacity relates to the hospital and healthcare system’s ability 
to respond to normal, daily fluctuations in patient census.40  
                                                 
35 Donna Barbisch and Kristi L. Koenig, “Understanding Surge Capacity: Essential Elements,” 
Academic Emergency Medicine: Official Journal of the Society for Academic Emergency Medicine 13, no. 
11 (November 2006): 1099.  
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Infrastructure Considerations for Mass Critical Care,” Intensive Care Medicine 36, no. Supplement 1 (April 
2010): 11–20, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1007/s00134-010-1761-4. 
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• Disaster surge capacity relates to the hospital and healthcare system’s 
ability to respond to demand influx exceeding normal capacity as the result 
of emergency or disaster events.41 
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II. HOSPITAL OVERCROWDING PROBLEM 
A. HOSPITAL OVERCROWDING CRISIS BACKGROUND AND CURRENT 
STATUS 
On September 10, 2001, U.S. News and World Report’s cover story focused on “an 
emergency care system in critical condition as a result of demands far in excess of its 
capacity.”42 This report was published a single day prior to the event that would forever 
change the direction of this nation’s homeland security policy and strategy. Unfortunately, 
little (if any) improvement has occurred in U.S. healthcare system capacity since that time. 
In 2014, the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) released a national report 
that graded U.S. emergency care on a national and state-by-state level.43 The overall rating 
for the nation in 2014 was a D+, a decrease from a C- in 2009.44 This grade, based on a 
nationwide study of EDs, focused on 136 measures in five categories: access to emergency 
care, quality and patient safety environment, medical liability environment, public health 
and injury prevention, and disaster preparedness.45 In addition to the 2014 ACEP report, 
numerous other scholars provide a consensus view that the U.S. emergency care system 
consistently remains in crisis.46  
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), ED visits 
increased from 97 million to 115 million between 1995 and 2005.47 Visits increased further 
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in 2010 to 130 million visits annually.48 These numbers demonstrate a 34% increase in ED 
visits between 1995 and 2010.49 The latest CDC data available from 2013 indicates that 
ED visits are holding steady at 130 million visits nationwide per year.50 “The ED visit rate 
increase is double what would be expected from U.S. population growth alone.”51 Further 
complicating the problem of the high volume of ED visits is the 11% overall decrease in 
the number of hospitals providing emergency care across the nation between 1995 and 
2010.52 The discrepancy between the growing number of ED visits and the declining 
number of EDs provides intuitive understanding of the demand versus capacity struggle 
that hospital EDs face every day.  
While the data continues to demonstrate a significant burden on hospitals, some 
recent positive trends have resulted. The most recent data from the CDC indicated that ED 
visits remained steady at approximately 130 million visits in 2013, which was the same in 
2010.53 Additionally, data indicate that the Affordable Care Act (ACA)’s requirement to 
allow young adults to remain on their parent’s insurance has resulted in a decrease in ED 
use by young adults.54 The 2014 ACA study demonstrated a lower increase in young adult 
(19–25 years) visits to an ED as compared to the sharper increase for adults 26 to 31.55 
Additionally, ED visits per 100 persons dropped to 41.9 according to the CDC’s most 
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recently available data from 2013, which is down from 43 visits per 100 persons in 2010.56 
Although this information does not demonstrate a complete downward trend, it may 
indicate that a plateau has been reached. Nevertheless, demand still outpaces the currently 
available supply.  
B. HOSPITAL OVERCROWDING CRISIS ORIGINS 
No single cause for the current crisis can be distinguished. To state that the issue is 
complicated is a radical understatement. Cherry and Trainer explain, “The causes are 
complex and multifactorial, but they have converged to present a severely overburdened 
system that regularly exceeds emergency capacity and capabilities.”57 The literature 
describes a wealth of origins for the current crisis. While a myriad of reasons for the current 
situation have been recognized, this paper focuses on the following causes: unintended 
consequences of laws, rules and regulations, changing demographics, imperfect business 
models resulting in decreased hospital emergency and inpatient capacity, and a lack of 
medical professionals to meet the current need. 
1. Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act  
One of the most frequently recognized causes of this national crisis is the 1986 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), which ensures “public access 
to emergency services regardless of ability to pay.”58 As a result of the law, EDs are the 
only providers of universal healthcare in the United States.59 They are a vital safeguard for 
the healthcare system in the United States, which consequently results in increased visits 
from uninsured and underinsured individuals.60 Additionally, EDs can be seen as a “safety 
                                                 
56 National Center for Health Statistics, National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey. 
57 Cherry and Trainer, “The Current Crisis in Emergency Care and the Impact on Disaster 
Preparedness,” 1. 
58 “Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA),” Centers for Medicare, Medicaid 
Services, March 26, 2012, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EMTALA/index. 
html. 
59 Cherry and Trainer, “The Current Crisis in Emergency Care and the Impact on Disaster 
Preparedness.” 
60 American College of Emergency Physicians, America’s Emergency Care Environment, A State-by-
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net for the safety net” meant to ensure healthcare is provided to this nation’s most 
vulnerable populations.61 In other words, they provide more “safety net type care”—that is 
designed to support those uninsured or those without the ability to pay—than any other 
safety net providers, such as federally qualified health centers (FQHCs), rural health 
centers (RHCs), or other free and low-income clinics combined, according to a 2000 
Institute of Medicine Report.62  
Furthermore, EDs serve as the primary access point into the hospital for ill patients 
who require admission.63 Primary care providers are relying more frequently on EDs to 
provide diagnostics, care, and treatment to their sickest and most complicated patients, 
because of the hospitals’64 24/7 availability and access to specialty services.65 A 2013 Rand 
Health Quarterly report determined the following: 
Between 2003 and 2009, inpatient admissions to U.S. hospitals grew at a 
slower rate than the population overall. However, nearly all of the growth 
in admissions was due to a 17 percent increase in unscheduled inpatient 
admissions from EDs. This growth in ED admissions more than offset a 10 
percent decrease in admissions from doctors' offices and other outpatient 
settings. This pattern suggests that office-based physicians are directing to 
EDs some of the patients they previously admitted to the hospital. 
EDs support primary care practices by performing complex diagnostic 
workups and handling overflow, after-hours, and weekend demand for care. 
Almost all of the physicians we interviewed—specialist and primary care 
alike—confirmed that office-based physicians increasingly rely on EDs to 
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evaluate complex patients with potentially serious problems, rather than 
managing these patients themselves.66 
The increased ED utilization by medical providers indicates “defensive medicine” 
in an effort to avoid medical liability lawsuits; in other words, those providers will often 
refer non-emergency patients to the EDs that provide 24/7 diagnostics instead of having 
patients wait for traditional appointments with specialist providers. The 2014 ACEP report 
on the United States’ emergency care environment cites “the failure to enact meaningful 
tort reform” as one of the contributing factors to this predicament.67 By attempting to avoid 
lawsuits, providers across the country are contributing to the overcrowding crisis by 
hampering EDs with inappropriately referred patients.  
These combined examples essentially demonstrate the expanding role of the ED to 
provide not only invaluable care during emergencies, but also provide “safety net care for 
uninsured patients, public health surveillance, disaster preparedness, and serving as an 
adjunct to community physician practices.”68 These collective features that contribute to 
ED overcrowding directly correlate to the ED’s requirement to provide care for all 
“individuals regardless of their insurance status or ability pay” as stipulated by EMTALA, 
as providers rely on the fact that the hospitals cannot turn away their patients.69 
2. Changing Demographics 
Another contributing factor to the issue relates directly to the country’s changing 
demographics. The world population, including the United States’, is getting older.70 
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Dobbs, Manyika, and Woetzel explain in their book, No Ordinary Disruption, that in 2013 
“older persons outnumbered children by a margin of 21 percent to 16 percent of the 
populations.”71 This aging population presents its own challenges within healthcare. A 
growing elderly population generally results in more complex health issues and more visits 
to the ED.72 The more complicated and higher acuity patients in the ED take more time 
and resources that thereby contribute to more overcrowding.73 Also, these higher acuity 
patients generally have increased the need for inpatient admission; furthermore, when beds 
are not available on the floor, the ED becomes a “pseudo-ICU” (intensive care unit) as it 
cares for these complex patients.74 Consequently, increased ED visits by more senior 
populations can have a dramatic effect on hospital capacity. 
Socioeconomic status also plays a role. Generally, uninsured patients are as much 
as three times more likely to visit an ED than insured patients.75 Low socioeconomic 
patients account for 60% of ED visits at rural hospitals, while 51% of acute visits for 
Medicaid patients are to the ED (instead of a primary care or outpatient provider).76 
Financial impediments to seeking healthcare outside of the ED play a critical role in 
pushing individuals to seek care in the ED. For example, reports indicate that 18% of 
children with insurance are underinsured, which results in their parents reporting 
unreasonable healthcare cost burdens.77 
3. Lack of Hospital Emergency Department and Inpatient Capacity  
The 2014 State-by-State Report Card by ACEP also identifies a lack of inpatient 
capacity as an underlying cause of the daily overcrowding dilemma.78 When no inpatient 
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beds are available, hospitals are often forced to board patients in the ED, which takes up 
valuable treatment space and staff resources. Not only is the ED flow affected but the EMS 
response can also be hindered as well when considering that the ability for an ED to have 
an efficient patient flow plays a key role in the overall success of patient throughput in the 
entire pre-hospital and hospital system. The report highlights that from 2009 to 2014, “the 
per capita rates of staffed inpatient beds have fallen from 358.3 to 329.5 per 100,000 
people, and psychiatric care beds have also declined from 29.9 to 26.1 per 100,000.” That 
rate follows a 39% decrease in inpatient beds between 1981 and 1999.79 Generally, the 
decrease in inpatient beds has been due to business strategies intended to ensure higher 
patient census, and thereby, the creation of more income.80 As Barish, Mcgauly, and 
Arnold describe, “Elective admissions reimburse better than poorly funded ER admissions 
and elective surgeries pay better than trauma in addition to being more predictable.”81 In 
other words, it ultimately, costs too much money for hospitals to keep empty beds available 
and staffed for disasters Thus, they do not do allow the practice to be implemented. 
Moreover, hospitals are often incentivized for maintaining a high census.82 Consequently, 
maintaining a “full house” for inpatient treatment capacity can wreak havoc on the 
hospital’s ED and its ability to respond to a disaster event.  
4. Lack of Appropriately Trained Staff 
Finally, the availability of ED and inpatient beds will have no impact on emergency 
overcrowding if professional medical personnel are not available to staff the beds. Chow, 
Niedzwiecki, and Hsia explain that staffed beds should be reviewed and considered in 
addition to licensed beds when considering a hospital’s daily or disaster surge capacity.83 
Essentially, they identify a significant gap between the beds that a hospital is allowed to 
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have (and that are usually considered when reporting their surge capability) according to 
their license and the beds they are actually able to staff.84 In their 2014 study, they found 
that, in California, only 59% of medical surgical licensed beds were staffed, and only 73% 
of cardiac critical care beds were staffed.85  
Staffing beds will continue to be a concern until nationwide shortages are 
addressed. A 2012 report projected a 300,000 to 1,000,000 nursing staff shortage by 
2020.86 Additionally, access to specialty physicians further contributes to the predicament. 
The ACEP report card states that there is only “a national average of about 2 neurosurgeons 
per 100,000 people; 2.2 plastic surgeons; 3.5 ENTs; and 9.7 orthopedists and hand 
surgeons.”87 Overall, a 2005 report predicted a shortage of 90,000 full-time doctors by the 
year 2020.88 Further compounding the issue is the fact that these rates do not account for 
the specialists’ “willingness to provide on-call services.”89 One national study from 2010 
of 442 hospitals across the nation found that nearly 75% of participating hospitals stated 
that the lack of on-call specialty surgeons affected their ED.90 Moreover, of the hospitals 
that reported some specialty surgeon on-call coverage, over 25% indicated that the 
coverage was undependable.91 The lack of surgical specialty physicians available for the 
ED results in frustrated patients who often leave prior to being properly evaluated or long 
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delays, which further crowds the ED, as patients cannot be appropriately dispositioned to 
an inpatient bed or discharged in a timely manner.92 
More recent studies show a slightly improved outlook for the current physician and 
nursing shortage. An article from 2016 by Mark Reiter, Leana Wen, and Brady Allen in 
the Journal of Emergency Medicine paints an improved picture of the future physician 
workforce, which asserts that enough ED physicians will be available over the next decade 
to meet the national demand.93 However, they concede, “low-volume rural EDs will 
continue to have difficulty attracting emergency medicine specialists.”94 Additionally, an 
updated 2018 forecast shows improvement for the nursing workforce; nevertheless, they 
still project a shortfall of over 150,000 nurses across the United States by 2020 and half a 
million nurses by 2030.95 Researchers identify several reasons for the shortage including 
medical programs not graduating enough students to meet the current patient demands 
across the nation at the same time that the current workforce is aging and retiring out of 
the system.96 Researchers also identify poor pay and job dissatisfaction as additional issues 
causing nursing shortages.97  
While the previously discussed forecasts and causes of the lack of appropriately 
trained medical staff are complex and multi-faceted, the results are the same. Hospitals find 
themselves critically disadvantaged when they cannot fill all the positions required to staff 
their emergency departments or their inpatient service areas for daily operations 
appropriately. Nationwide, the availability of staffed beds remains around 5% on any given 
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day.98 This percentage indicates that very little capacity exists for fluctuations in patient 
volume on any given day.  
C. CONSEQUENCES OF THE HOSPITAL OVERCROWDING CRISIS 
The consequences of the demand and capacity crisis in this nation’s hospitals are 
widespread. This section briefly discusses some of the well-known patient safety and 
clinical outcome concerns associated with ED overcrowding and the “boarding” of 
patients. Additionally, the impact on pre-hospital response capacity and care due to hospital 
overcrowding are considered. Finally, the reliability of hospitals to be able to sufficiently 
respond to emergency and disaster events is questioned as a result of their failure to manage 
day-to-day surge events. 
1. Patient Safety and Clinical Outcomes  
Although a lot more research can be conducted, adverse effects have been 
recognized related to hospital overcrowding and ED boarding since the onset of the current 
crisis.99 One study determined a 2% increase in mortality for patients boarded for more 
than 12 hours in the ED while waiting for an inpatient bed.100 Another study concluded 
that 28% of boarded patients experienced a negative outcome while being housed in the 
ED awaiting an inpatient bed.101  
Timeliness is imperative in medical care, especially when recognizing and 
responding to conditions like heart attacks, sepsis, or stroke, and timeliness can be a 
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challenge in an overcrowded ED.102 For example, several studies have demonstrated that 
increased ED overcrowding and patient lengths of stay are correlated to the delayed receipt 
of timely antibiotics, which can affect things like sepsis outcomes.103 Overall, “EDs are 
often high-risk, high-stress environments fraught with opportunities for error.”104 ED 
overcrowding needlessly creates an added risk for error in an already complex 
environment. 
2. Pre-hospital Response Impact 
In addition to patient safety within the ED, overcrowding can also directly impact 
EMS response and capacity within the community. EMS response times within the 
community are traditionally closely monitored to validate the strategy of the community’s 
EMS system.105 However, the response times often do not consider the delays EMS crews 
experience waiting to turn over patient care at EDs.106 Response times are critical to EMS 
because there is a “direct association with a patient’s chance of survival following a cardiac 
arrest and other emergencies.”107 Consequently, EMS crews who are “parked” in an ED 
for an inordinate amount of time are not available to respond to other critical need patients 
within the community, which adversely affects the community’s 911-response system.108 
Furthermore, the EMS units unable to respond to routine 911 calls because of transfer of 
care delays caused by ED overcrowding may also be unavailable to respond expeditiously 
to mass casualty events.  
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3. Effect on Disaster Response  
Finally, the routine saturation of hospital beds and the predictable difficulty in 
managing daily surge within hospitals reflect widely expressed concerns regarding the 
hospitals’ ability to respond to disasters.109 In their paper on the threat ED overcrowding 
poses to public health, Trzeciak and Rivers assert, “overcrowded EDs would be ill 
equipped to handle mass casualty victims in a disaster scenario.”110 They hypothesize that 
hospital overcrowding results in greater challenges to expand capacity during mass 
casualty events and surmise that hospitals are at a disadvantage from the very onset of a 
response.111 The implications of an ED overcrowding’s effect on surge capacity are 
instinctive and often referenced throughout the reviewed literature; nevertheless, little 
measurable research is available to support the theory.112 However, since this area of 
research is emerging, future opportunities to investigate these postulations are possible. 
Representative Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, requested one such study that attempted 
to demonstrate quantifiably the effect of daily hospital overcrowding on disaster surge 
capacity in 2008 following the 2004 Madrid, Spain train attack that killed 177 people and 
injured more than 2,000.113 The request was made to survey seven level 1 trauma centers 
across the United States to determine if they had the capacity to respond to a Madrid-like 
event.114 The survey was conducted on a single day in 2008 and the seven respondents 
were asked to provide their real-time ability to respond to the mass casualty event.115 “The 
results of the survey show[ed] that none of the hospitals surveyed in the seven cities had 
sufficient emergency care capacity to respond to an attack generating the number of 
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causalities that occurred in Madrid.”116 Furthermore, the report indicated that all the 
hospitals reported that their EDs, critical care, and inpatient beds were basically full at the 
onset of the survey, which impacted the ability to respond.117 Again, this emerging field of 
research presents more opportunities to collect objective evidence; nevertheless, this single 
study was able to demonstrate similarity in the impact of daily overcrowding on the 
emergency and disaster response capabilities on trauma centers across the United States. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The challenges associated with the U.S. healthcare system may be best described 
as wicked problems. A wicked problem, as defined by Horst Rittel and Melvin Ritter in 
1973, is described as a problem not easily defined and even more difficult to solve due to 
its complexity and interdependency, contradictory, or evolving requirements, and a lack of 
a concrete and identifiable solution.118 While the overcrowding crisis is just a symptom of 
the overall challenges associated with the U.S. healthcare system, it possesses its own 
unique complexity. Researchers identify numerous causes for the crisis, many of which 
intermingle and relate. Additionally, the consequences of the crisis are also widespread and 
exceedingly multifaceted. Consequently, this thesis focuses on questions surrounding its 
impact on hospital disaster response.  
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III. DEFINING SURGE AND UNDERSTANDING SURGE 
CAPACITY 
A. UNDERSTANDING SURGE AND SURGE CAPACITY 
Before hospitals and healthcare coalitions can plan to meet surge capacity targets, 
they must first agree on what surge and surge capacity means. “Differences in the 
conceptions of health system surge capacity begin at the level of first principles, with 
contention over what constitutes a surge event, scenario, or process.”119 Barbisch and 
Koenig get to the heart of the problem when they state:  
It is difficult to determine: Prepared for what? How much is enough? How 
fast do we need it? Where are we going to get it? Even if we can afford it, 
how do we maintain capability? Given our need for support from other 
functional areas, how do we link with their resources?120  
To assert that this problem is complex is an understatement. For example, surge 
capacity planning relates to what healthcare emergency response planners routinely refer 
to as the “4 Ss,” which are space, staff, supplies, and standard of care. Each of the four 
topics possesses a myriad of topics, issues, and concerns for consideration. Barbisch and 
Koenig further separate surge event planning into two categories: sudden impact and 
obscure. Sudden impact surge events have abrupt onset and are generally shorter in 
duration, whereas obscure surge events may take longer to recognize, may be more 
widespread, or may take longer to resolve.121 Sudden impact surge event examples include 
the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing or the Las Vegas shooting of 2017. Obscure events 
comprise Hurricane Katrina or large-scale disease outbreaks. Figures 1 and 2, developed 
by Barbish and Koenig in “Understanding Surge Capacity: Essential Elements,” 
demonstrate their concepts as they relate to event timing and duration and surge needs. 
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Figure 1. Surge Timeline for Sudden Impact Event122 
 
 
Figure 2. Surge Timeline for Obscure Events123 
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Taking an additional viewpoint, John Hick, Michael Christian, and Charles Sprung 
expand surge capacity planning classifications into three functional elements: 
conventional, contingency, and crisis.124 Conventional surge capacity “utilizes usual 
patient care spaces, resources and practices.”125 Contingency surge capacity operates in 
“adapted areas of the facility…including adaptations to standard staffing and resource 
practices to provide functionally equivalent medical care, with minimal increase in risk to 
the patient.”126 In addition, crisis surge capacity refers to situations where “significant 
changes to standard staffing and resource practices” is required. This level of care “may 
significantly impact patient morbidity and mortality.”127 Figure 3 blends the concepts 
between the four components of surge and the three functional elements: 
 
Figure 3. Four Components of Surge as They Relate to the Three 
Functional Elements128 
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Consequently, considering the scope and depth of the debate on the range of formal 
definitions, this research applies the following definition provided by the Joint Commission 
in 2003: 
Surge capacity encompasses potential beds; available space in which 
patients may be triaged, managed, vaccinated, decontaminated, or simply 
located; available personnel of all types; necessary medications, supplies, 
and equipment; and even the legal capacity to deliver healthcare under 
situations which exceed capacity.129 
Furthermore, surge capacity planners must consider the aforementioned definition 
that includes the “4 Ss” while also considering the consequence (conventional, 
contingency, and crisis capacity) and timing (sudden onset or obscure nature) of the 
disaster or surge event. However, none of these definitions addresses the baseline capacity 
of the hospital or healthcare organization and its effect on meeting surge demands.  
B. BUILDING SURGE CAPACITY THROUGH IMMEDIATE BED 
AVAILABILITY 
Creating immediate bed availability (IBA) is the initial and perhaps most critical 
approach for generating surge capacity in hospitals and healthcare systems. Generally, 
initial surge goals—such as those required by the HPP—require a target of 20% IBA within 
four hours of the onset of an incident.130 ASPR and other organizations often describe the 
three following main pillars for creating IBA: ensuring systems are in place to document 
in real-time where bed availability exists, making certain procedures are in place for 
immediately off-loading of patients from the hospital or healthcare organization, and 
implementing protocols to increase or augment resources in an effort to on-load patients.131 
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Additionally, some ASPR guidance documents add a fourth pillar, maintaining capabilities 
to track patients throughout the healthcare system.132  
Specific tactics concentrating on decompressing the hospital (or off-loading 
patients) consist of canceling elective surgeries and procedures and quickly discharging 
patients medically able to home. Hospitals may also off-load patients by transferring 
patients to other facilities or discharging patients who might require more medical support 
than they can receive at home alone to long-term care or utilize home health services. On-
boarding tactics include those that create extra space, such as converting single rooms to 
double rooms or utilizing non-traditional patient care areas like hallways, lobbies, or 
waiting rooms. Opening closed areas or converting certain areas to new uses, such as 
converting a step-down unit to a critical care unit, also serve to increase bed capacity 
rapidly. Other on-boarding tactics focus on increasing personnel to take care of the influx 
of patients. These tactics include modifying or extending work hours, calling back off-duty 
staff, and using non-traditional care providers, such as family members, volunteers, or non-
clinical staff. For these tactics to be truly successful, the hospital and healthcare system 
must maintain situational awareness—ensuring the ability to monitory patient acuity, 
volume, and bed availability—both internally to the organization and externally. 
Healthcare coalitions, discussed in more detail in the following chapter, serve to support 
the external situational awareness, information sharing, and resource coordination 
efforts.133 
All these strategies exist to “quickly provide higher-level care to more serious 
patients during a disaster with no new space, personnel, or equipment.”134 The Michigan 
Department of Health and Human Services’ “Michigan Immediate Bed Availability 
Decompression Strategy Guidelines and Toolkit” outlines many of the specific tactics 
recommended to create IBA. Figure 4 combines the strategies outlined in the Michigan 
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toolkit with the pillars and their intended influences on the “4Ss” in an effort to bring all 
the concepts together.  
 
Figure 4. IBA Strategies by Pillar and Intended Influence on the 
“4Ss” 
C. DESCRIBING A SUCCESSFUL SURGE RESPONSE: THE BOSTON 
MARATHON BOMBING 
The Boston area hospital response to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombing 
is often described as a “best practice” event that demonstrates the effectiveness of national 
healthcare surge strategies and IBA response tactics.135 Three people tragically died on the 
scene during the initial blasts. However, despite the severity of the injuries at the scene and 
the large number of victims, every single patient who left the incident alive ultimately 
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survived.136 This outcome is unheard of within the medical community when considering 
the quantity and the severity of the traumatic injuries from the blasts.137  
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) activities are highlighted due to the detail 
of the publicly available information on its response. MGH is a 907-bed level I trauma 
hospital in the heart of Boston. The large, teaching hospital boasts that it has 61 operating 
rooms that average over 150 surgeries per day.138 It also reports robust staffing levels with 
staff trained because of frequent schedule changes due to unforeseen events, such as 
multiple trauma patients or transplant donors.139  
At 2:49 pm on April 15, 2013, explosions triggered by two bombs left near the 
Boston Marathon finish line caused three deaths and an estimated 264 injured; many of 
whom had traumatic amputations.140 First responders, who were already working the 
marathon finish line, turned the area into a triage unit and started treating victims.141 
Twenty-seven Boston area hospitals received patients from the event, with the most serious 
patients being evenly distributed to the five level I trauma hospitals in downtown 
Boston.142 Initial actions at Boston area hospitals included the following traditional surge 
principles to offload patients, assess resources, and prepare for patient on-loading: 
Hospital staff relocated patients to clear the emergency department, 
prepared operating rooms, and pre-positioned trauma teams. The incident 
commander for the emergency department coordinated the clearing of 
emergency rooms and the mobilization of staff and equipment. Hospitals 
also alerted their Radiology Departments to ensure the availability of 
technicians and equipment, such as CT scanners and X-ray units. 
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Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) suspended routine CT scans in 
order to have them available for bombing victims and asked technologists 
to standby with portable imaging units.143 
MGH staff reported receiving the first notifications of the bombing via social media 
just prior to 3:00 pm.144 The hospital leadership received official notification of the event 
through the Boston EMS system at 3:00 pm. They activated their disaster response at 3:03 
pm based on the initial notifications from Boston EMS, which resulted in the 
operationalization of an incident command structure within the hospital. The first patient 
arrived at 3:04 pm.145  
Staff within the hospital reported that they began operationalizing surge plans 
following the initial social media notifications and after the internal disaster declaration, 
prior to any official activation.146 The initial steps included assessing staffing and operating 
room availability. Therefore, team leaders ordered day-shift members to remain on shift; 
thereby, increasing staffing resources as the night shift staff had already begun to arrive for 
their 3:00 pm shift. Furthermore, they rapidly determined that 32 active procedures were 
going on in the operating room that resulted in 26 available operating rooms and teams. 
The leadership team determined that the surgical resources available were sufficient to care 
for arriving patients. While operating room staff and space were sufficient, the team 
quickly realized that supplies for treating the blast wounds were not. The operating room 
received its first patient 20 minutes after its initial notification. In the end, MGH received 
32 patients from the blast with seven patients requiring amputation procedures.147 
Identified issues shared by hospital responders following the events during lessons learned 
presentations included the need to secure amputation kits from neighboring healthcare 
                                                 
143 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2.  
144 Hemingway and Ferguson, “Boston Bombings: Response to Disaster.” 
145 Hemingway and Ferguson, “Boston Bombings: Response to Disaster.” 
146 Hemingway and Ferguson, “Boston Bombings: Response to Disaster.” 
147 Hemingway and Ferguson, “Boston Bombings: Response to Disaster.” 
35 
coalitions and jurisdictions, as well as blood and blood products from neighboring states.148 
Nevertheless, successfully caring for that number of traumatic patients in a short amount 
of time effectively illustrates the efficacious use of surge planning tactics, especially those 
designed to create IBA in EDs and operating rooms. 
D. LINGERING QUESTIONS 
MGH and other Boston area hospitals also reported several fortuitous events that 
facilitated their surge response that highlight some of the lingering questions surrounding 
the current U.S. surge policy. Arthur Kellerman and Kobi Peleg describe six additional 
events that may have contributed to the successful response in the New England Journal 
of Medicine:  
The bombing occurred at a major event where large numbers of police, 
security, and EMS personnel were already deployed. 
Because it was race day—indeed, a state holiday—it is likely that the city’s 
operating rooms and other clinical services were running at less than full 
capacity. 
The attack happened shortly before the 3:00 pm change of shift at area 
hospitals. As a result, a full complement of administrative staff and two 
shifts of health care providers were on site at each facility.  
The bombs were detonated in a city that is home to seven trauma centers 
and multiple world-class hospitals…Boston EMS personnel wisely 
distributed casualties among the area’s trauma centers, so each one received 
a manageable number. 
The bombers detonated their relatively low-yield devices out-of-doors. A 
bombing inside a closed space (e.g., a building, bus, or train) produces more 
primary blast injuries (e.g., blast lung) and fatalities, because surrounding 
walls concentrate blast waves. The absence of structural collapse facilitated 
the swift extrication of victims.  
Although most health care providers in the United States have never treated 
a bombing victim, lessons learned by military surgeons, emergency 
physicians, and nurses in Iraq and Afghanistan are progressively percolating 
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through the trauma care community. Moreover, hundreds of Boston's 
prehospital and hospital-based responders had already learned the basics of 
blast-injury care and the operational challenges their city could face.149 
MGH data supports the assertions made by Kellerman and Peleg. At the start of the day, 
the hospital had only 51 of the 61 operating rooms scheduled, with 40 rooms expected to 
be operational at 3:00 pm.150 Furthermore, they had full staffing from the morning shift 
available with additional staffing scheduled to arrive at 3:00 pm for the evening shift. This 
staffing resulted in 180 nurses available at 3:30 pm instead of the 88 scheduled for the night 
shift.151  
This thesis does not emphasize these incidental factors to undermine the remarkable 
response of Boston area hospitals, such as MGH, in the face of a devastating tragedy or to 
diminish the effect of implementing surge strategies and tactics. Clearly, IBA tactics 
worked in this response and the patient volume did not exceed the 20% IBA threshold for 
the Boston area hospitals. Instead, it emphasizes them in an effort to draw attention to the 
foundational questions of this thesis related to healthcare surge and crisis response strategy: 
• If the Boston area hospitals had been experiencing their normal 
overcrowding levels for a Monday, would their response and the outcomes 
have been the same? What is the impact of overcrowding on surge 
response capabilities? How can hospitals or healthcare coalitions 
gather data to answer this question? Does the question need to be 
answered? 
• Boston boasts one of the most accomplished areas in the country for 
hospitals and healthcare assets and capabilities, with 20 hospitals in the 
city (seven of which are level 1 trauma centers).152 If the bombing 
happened in another city, with fewer hospitals, capabilities, and resources, 
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would the results have been the same? What is the impact on baseline 
capabilities and resources on surge response? What should baseline 
capabilities be? 
• The number of victims at the Boston Marathon would be classified as a 
major incident for most areas but was managed within Boston without 
overwhelming any one hospital. What is considered a “major” event 
versus a “minor” event? Is the scope of an event defined as major or 
minor determined by whether or not surge practices and IBA were 
implemented?  
• While the bombing resulted in numerous traumatic injuries, the surge 
itself to area hospitals was over within a few hours. What would be the 
consequences of a more long-term surge event? Would the surge strategies 
and IBA tactics be sufficient for a longer event?  
E. CONCLUSION 
The questions posed regarding surge and surge capacity are numerous and 
complicated. In an effort to create a manageable scope, this thesis concentrates on the 
questions related to whether daily hospital overcrowding influences disaster response 
capabilities or if baseline-operating status at the time of the event should be considered 
when formulating surge strategies. Kellerman and Peleg spell out the concerns when 
stating:  
As we reflect on Boston’s response, it’s not enough to enumerate what went 
well; we must understand why. Otherwise, some citizens and health care 
professionals may erroneously conclude that it doesn’t matter if emergency 
departments are crowded and if disaster plans and rigorous drills are 
lacking, because their hospital’s medical staff will simply ‘rise to the 
occasion.’ That’s a risky bet.153 
Even when considering successful surge capacity responses, such as the Boston 
Marathon bombing, it is shortsighted to assume surge capacity strategies and IBA tactics 
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alone provide hospitals with the tools needed to respond effectively to any disaster event. 
This response potentially can be true in light of the daily challenges hospitals must 
overcome due to overcrowding. However, data must first be gathered to determine if 
baseline capacity is an issue for surge response at all. The following chapter focuses on 
how the questions surrounding those concerns can be answered by examining healthcare 
coalitions and how they can be leveraged to support answering the questions.  
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IV. HEALTHCARE COALITIONS 
The protection and security of the U.S. healthcare community remains a high order 
task, especially when considering the complex amalgam of public and private entities 
involved in the system that must be able to coordinate response and information during 
disaster events. “Increasingly, the USA is building national capabilities to improve health 
security, which is defined as a state in which the nation and its people are prepared for, 
protected from, and resilient in the face of health threats.”154 To improve health security, a 
system must be in place to strengthen the U.S. health system at the local, state, and federal 
level with a focus on planning and preparing for and responding to any type of event that 
may affect the health.155 Although Alex Mills et al. focus on urban environments in their 
paper, “Coordination of Autonomous Healthcare Entities: Emergency Response to 
Multiple Casualty Incidents,” many of the concepts they describe also apply to suburban 
and even rural environments.156 They use the term slack capacity, which they describe as 
possessing the extra capacity to respond to an incident (e.g., increasing daily surge capacity 
for overcrowding much like disaster capacity).157 In an effort to combat the lack of surge 
capacity, Mills et al. explain the need for independent healthcare agencies to work together 
to respond to events.158 Since they focus on urban environments, they use “urban multiple 
casualty incidents (UMCI),” which they define as “an incident with two or more persons 
needing medical attention, and multiple care resources involved in the response” as an 
example to demonstrate the need for partnership.159 In reality, a UMCI is no different from 
a multiple casualty incident in any environment; they all require multiple response or 
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treatment resources. Nevertheless, their central concept remains valid; they state, “the 
salient feature of a UMCI is not the absolute number of casualties, but the fact that multiple 
autonomous entities must work together to place them with an appropriate care 
resource.”160 In the past, independent hospitals and healthcare organizations did not always 
recognize the need to join forces during these incidents, but recent events and guidance 
have begun to shift those beliefs.  
This chapter first explores the origins of healthcare coalitions. Next, the chapter 
delves into healthcare coalitions today to include their organization, function, and role in 
emergency response. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on the federal 
capabilities guidance and performance measures for healthcare coalitions, which centers 
specifically on capabilities and measures related to surge capacity building and response, 
as well as data collection efforts that currently exist.  
A. WHAT IS A HEALTHCARE COALITION? 
As the recognition for national capabilities and capacity grew over the past two 
decades, many communities realized that they would be better served if they established 
“regional collaborations among health care organizations, providers, emergency managers, 
public sector and other private partners” to respond to these multiple casualty incidents.161 
This sort of grassroots effort within the healthcare community led to the initial 
establishment of some of the first healthcare coalitions.162 As Melissa Harvey, the current 
director of the HPP, and others state:  
Large-scale emergencies, such as a terrorist bombing, would require a 
complex response across an entire region. Hospitals, in conjunction with 
EMS and public health and emergency management agencies, must work 
together under the rubric of a health care coalition to ensure collaboration, 
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coordination, and consistency in a systems approach to disaster planning 
and response.163  
Healthcare coalitions are most simply defined as “groups of health care and 
response organizations that collaborate to prepare for and respond to medical surge 
events.”164 Through working together before and during emergencies, these independent 
(and often competing) organizations can recognize the benefit of cooperation.165 Brooke 
Courtney et al. more specifically define healthcare coalitions as “a formal collaboration 
among hospitals, public health departments, emergency management and response 
agencies, and possibly other types of healthcare entities in a community that are organized 
to prepare for and respond to mass casualty and catastrophic health events.”166 One 
important key to the success of healthcare coalitions lies in the fact that they do not negate 
nor do they prevent individual healthcare organizations from preparing for or responding 
to events; instead, they are meant to augment the individual organization’s response 
through cooperation.167 
B. HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM AND HEALTHCARE 
COALITION HISTORY 
The establishment of formal healthcare coalitions across the country begins with 
the creation of the HPP. “The Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) provides leadership 
and funding through grants and cooperative agreements to States, territories, and eligible 
municipalities to improve surge capacity and enhance community and hospital 
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preparedness for public health emergencies.”168 Furthermore, “it is the only source of 
federal funding for health care delivery system readiness.”169 Since the program’s 
inception in 2002, the HPP has distributed nearly $6 billion to help in the development, 
sustainment, and growth of healthcare coalitions in an effort to improve this nation’s 
healthcare emergency response capabilities.170  
The HPP was created after September 11, 2001 (9/11), as the federal government 
leadership recognized the fractured healthcare and medical response to the attacks; 
consequently, the program initially focused on bioterrorism and individual hospital 
preparedness, and more specifically, sought to increase capacity for hospitals.171 Before 
9/11, grant programs focused on weapons of mass destruction preparedness and response, 
such as the Nunn-Luger-Domenici grants of the 1990s.172 These grants provided limited 
guidance and encouragement for pursuing a regional healthcare response approach.173 
These grants were the impetus that began the move towards healthcare coalitions for some 
forward thinking leaders in some communities.174 Additionally, HSS initiated the 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) in 1996 after recognizing U.S. 
vulnerabilities following the nerve agent attacks in the Tokyo subway and the Oklahoma 
City bombing in 1995.175 The MMRS system had similar directives as those of the HPP 
but was focused solely on the urban setting. This gap provided the opportunity for the 
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development of a new, nationwide program to focus on the emergency response 
capabilities for the U.S. healthcare system in the creation of the HPP.  
At its inception in 2002, the HPP was a part of the Health Resources Services 
Administration (HRSA).176 In 2006, following the passage of the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA), the HPP moved under the HHS’ ASPR.177 At that 
time, the focus of the program shifted away from basic capacity building and “shifted 
toward a capabilities approach to medical disaster response, focusing on such areas as 
personnel management, interoperable communications, and bed tracking.”178 Overall, in 
the subsequent years, the HPP has repeatedly demonstrated much advancement in 
cultivating the health system’s capabilities to respond to emergencies and disasters.179  
A 2007 study, commissioned by the ASPR at HHS, sought to evaluate the current 
state of hospital and healthcare system preparedness and make recommendations on future 
program directions for the ASPR and the HPP.180 The assessment found that preparedness 
for individual hospitals across the country had dramatically improved since the inception 
of the HPP.181 They supported this conclusion by identifying that hospital senior leaders 
were more involved in disaster response and had appointed personnel to focus on 
emergency planning, resource needs had been identified and stockpiled, community-wide 
information sharing and situational awareness had increased, and hospitals and health care 
partners had begun to plan, train, and exercise together.182 However, probably the most 
important finding in this study identified the emergence and benefits of healthcare 
coalitions in pockets throughout the country.183 After this study, the ASPR through the 
HPP grant program began to require the development of healthcare coalitions across the 
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nation. Between 2012 and 2016, the HPP focused on supporting the development and initial 
growth of healthcare coalitions.184 The program then demonstrated increasing maturation 
in June 2013 with the release of its initial set of “true performance measures, requiring 
health care coalitions to demonstrate not just the existence of plans but the ability to 
implement those plans during a disaster.”185 These measures sought to demonstrate that the 
focus of the progress shifted from being capacity-based to capability-based.186 To 
distinguish between capacity-based and capability-based simply means that the program 
emphasis changed from ensuring that hospitals had enough staff and stuff to respond to 
disasters to ensuring protocols, plans, and policies existed to provide a community-wide, 
systems-based response capability. 
C. HEALTHCARE COALITIONS TODAY 
The 2017–2022 Health Care Preparedness and Response Capabilities (HPP 
Capabilities document) drives most of the activities of healthcare coalitions today.187 
Melissa Harvey et al. describe the current program: 
The capabilities are defined around 4 broad themes: ensuring a strong 
foundation for health care and medical readiness (including strong 
administrative and financial backing for disaster planning efforts), ensuring 
health care and medical response coordination by understanding that each 
of the key participants in the health care coalition has a role to support one 
another in response, promoting continuity of health care service delivery 
(recognizing that disruptions in service delivery constitute failure), and 
planning for medical surge to ensure timely and efficient care to patients 
even when the demand for health care exceeds available supply.188 
Currently, 476 health care coalitions (HCCs) exist across the nation made up of 
over 31,000 member organizations that work together to ensure continued attention on 
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enabling local communities to respond to and recover effectively from disasters with 
limited reliance on state and federal partners.189 The composition of HCCs varies widely 
throughout the nation. “History, politics, existing relationships (e.g. among healthcare care 
institutions and with public health and emergency management agencies), hazards, 
geography, and culture all contribute to developing and operating the optimal healthcare 
coalition in each community.”190 The bottom line persists that prosperous coalitions exist 
because of the level of involvement and dedication of their leaders and their member 
organizations, not what they look like on paper.  
1. Healthcare Coalition Organization 
If you’ve seen one healthcare coalition, you’ve seen one healthcare 
coalition. 
—Common phrase expressed in the HPP community 
 
Recognizing the diversity of the health care system across the country, the HPP 
wisely avoids prescribing how coalitions should be developed and managed; thereby, 
allowing the members to dictate the structure and governance of each coalition. 
Consequently, as community needs develop, coalitions evolve to meet them.191 Brooke 
Courtney et al. describe the variety in coalition governance in great detail stating, 
“coalitions have been formed by building on preexisting structures or entities (eg, 
Metropolitan Medical Response System [MMRS] groups), having the public health 
department serve as the organizing body, having a dominant hospital system bring 
neighboring hospitals together, or collaboratively creating an entirely new body.”192 
Additionally, coalition partners formalize relationships with the use of mutual aid 
agreements that outline how the members will share information and resources and 
coordinate responses between member organizations.193 The administrative structure and 
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legal authorities of HCCs also vary with some seeking non-profit status that requires a 
formal executive body and director. State and local public health lead some HCCs, while 
influential hospitals drive other coalitions.194 Finally, some coalitions rely on a formal 
structure with representative voting while others exist in a more democratic state with all 
members receiving equal say in coalition affairs.195 No matter the type of formal or 
informal relationships established, the key is to create a defined network of partner 
organizations that establish methods of working together to prepare for and respond to 
emergencies.  
Just as the governance structure of coalitions differs across the nation, so do the 
geographic boundaries and their definition of what their “communities” include. Therefore, 
HCC geographic boundaries may encompass an entire state, a region, a county, a city, or 
(for large metropolitan areas) a part of a city. They can even cross state and typical planning 
region borders. The bottom line is that the geography must reflect the needs, actualities, 
and healthcare referral patterns within the area and work for the coalition.196 
Healthcare coalition membership also fluctuates widely. The current HPP guidance 
requires core membership from hospitals, public health, EMS, and emergency 
management.197 HCCs should also ensure “a connection to the local/state incident 
command system (ICS), in collaboration with public health authorities through Emergency 
Support Function (ESF)–8 of the National Response Framework (NRF).”198 However, as 
coalitions evolve, so does their membership. Wide varieties of healthcare and support 
organizations “such as specialty hospitals, long-term care facilities, dialysis centers, free-
standing clinics, and surgical centers” now participate in healthcare coalitions.199 Other 
non-healthcare specific entities may participate as well, such as the American Red Cross 
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and other non-governmental organizations that may participate in supporting coalition 
efforts, medical examiners, blood suppliers, medical equipment and resource suppliers, 
universities, etc. Just as with the governance and geography, a coalition may invite any 
organization to participate that will help meet the needs and goals of the HCC.  
2. Healthcare Coalition Functions 
No matter how different each coalition looks from another across the nation, each 
shares several critical roles. Just as the composition of the coalitions cannot be prescribed, 
neither can the way they complete their roles be prearranged.200 “Broadly speaking, HCCs 
engage in two main activities: (i) coordination in the management of emergency response, 
and (ii) training, education, and group purchasing to improve emergency preparedness.”201 
They complete these tasks by engaging in several specific activities, briefly described later 
in this section. They are also provided in more detail in Appendix A, which is a crosswalk 
between the HPP Capabilities document and the 2017–2022 HPP Performance Measures 
Implementation Guidance (Performance Measures Guidance document) and provides a 
concise summary of the relevant HCC functional expectations and directives.  
According to the HPP Capabilities document, healthcare coalitions are tasked with 
meeting four main capabilities described in the following four paragraphs. HCCs are first 
tasked with formalizing their structure and activities. At a foundational level, they do so by 
defining their boundaries, membership, and governance. Additionally, they must identify 
risks, gaps, and needs through completing a hazard vulnerability assessment and gap 
analysis. They must also assess how they can support regulatory compliance efforts for 
their member organizations. HCCs must also create preparedness plans that detail the 
administrative and daily undertakings of the coalition. The guidance further requires HCCs 
to assist with preparing healthcare personnel and coalition members by supporting trainings 
and exercises. Finally, as a part of the formalization process, the HPP tasks HCCs with 
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ensuring key stakeholders remain engaged, which provides an opportunity to share the 
value of the coalition and enhance coalition sustainability.202 
Next, the HPP requires coalitions to prepare to respond. Consequently, HCCs must 
produce and adopt a response plan that details how the coalitions will share information 
and resources. Moreover, they must define how they coordinate healthcare response 
operations and communicate with members and other partner organizations within their 
jurisdiction.203 “HCCs serve as multiagency coordination groups that support and integrate 
with ESF-8 activities in the context of incident command system (ICS) responsibilities.”204 
For the most part, individual coalition members must respond to incidents under their own 
organization’s authority and follow their own response plans. According to a 2017 survey 
conducted by the National Organization of City and County Health Officials (NACCHO) 
of eight diverse healthcare coalitions across the country, HCCs response functions may 
include “sharing information and resources between HCC members and with other 
jurisdictional partners, coordinating patient movement and evacuation, conducting disease 
surveillance functions, and providing staff to support emergency operations centers.”205 
In addition to formalizing their preparedness and response activities, HCCs must 
work to ensure the continuity of the healthcare system within their jurisdiction. Activities, 
such as creating a continuity of operations plan, evaluating the integrity of supply chains, 
and developing plans to manage resource shortages, embodies key requirements for the 
capabilities related to resilience. Furthermore, coalitions must identify and define activities 
that ensure the safety of the healthcare workforce. Additionally, they are tasked with 
identifying the required strategies and tactics associated with evacuating healthcare 
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facilities. Finally, to ensure continuity, the HPP requires coalitions to facilitate recovery 
planning for their member organizations.206  
Lastly, coalitions are required to ensure their member organizations plan for and 
are capable of responding to medical surge events. They must support the development of 
member organization surge plans, while facilitating the development of strategies to 
address special populations like children or functional needs individuals. Additionally, 
specific risks, such as burn, radiological, trauma, and infectious disease, must be addressed 
by coalitions or their member organizations.207 More detail about surge response strategies 
and tactics for emergencies are explained in more detail in the following section. 
D. BRINGING IT TOGETHER: HEALTHCARE COALITIONS AND THEIR 
SURGE POLICY REQUIREMENTS 
Specific to healthcare surge capacity building, the HPP Capabilities document 
requires, “Health care organizations—including hospitals, EMS, and out-of-hospital 
providers—deliver timely and efficient care to their patients even when the demand for 
health care services exceeds available supply.”208 The guidance directs HCCs to support 
surge efforts by augmenting information sharing and resource coordination. It states:  
Health care organizations can most effectively implement and manage 
medical surge when appropriate information sharing systems and 
procedures have been established, appropriate plans for all levels of care 
and populations have been developed, and personnel have been trained in 
their use.209 
The capabilities, as outlined in Appendix A, break down into objectives and 
activities. Capability 4 (medical surge) Objective 2 (respond to a medical surge) explicitly 
addresses healthcare surge planning targets. Specifically, the guidance requires that HCCs:  
Ensure IBA [immediate bed availability] (at least 20 percent additional 
acute hospital inpatient capacity within the first four hours following an 
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emergency) by rapidly prioritizing patients for discharge, maximizing the 
use of staffed beds, and using non-traditional spaces (e.g., observation 
areas).210 
Further reinforcing the surge policy target, the companion document to ASPR’s 
HPP Capabilities document, the 2017–2022 Hospital Preparedness Program Performance 
Measures Implementation Guidance also utilizes the 20% benchmark. Appendix A 
outlines all the measures as they relate to the capabilities. Several of the performance 
measures relate directly to a coalition surge test (CST) exercise. The CST requires each 
HCC across the country to demonstrate the ability to evacuate 20% of its acute care hospital 
beds by utilizing IBA strategies, and identify proper patient placement at receiving 
hospitals and healthcare organizations, and transportation resources within a 90-minute 
period.211 The HPP requires the use of a standardized data collection tool for all coalitions 
across the country. The intent of data collection from the CST for the HPP is to create a 
baseline from which program benchmarks can be identified for HCCs throughout 
country.212 While the scenario for the CST revolves around forced evacuation, the intention 
of the exercise is that HCCs should use the exercise to demonstrate capabilities to share 
information, coordinate emergency operations, and respond to a medical surge event.213  
Figures 5 and 6 identify the key data points related to surges that HCCs capture 
each year utilizing the CST tool implemented in 2017. The entire CST tool is located in 
Appendix B. Figure 5 shows the data captured from the evacuating facilities, while Figure 
6 documents the data captured from receiving facilities within the healthcare coalition.  
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Figure 5. CST Data Collection from Evacuating Facility at Start of 
the CST Exercise214 
 
Figure 6. CST Data Collection from Receiving Facilities during the 
CST Exercise215 
E. CONCLUSION 
Healthcare coalitions have rapidly evolved over the past decade to become diverse 
organizations with a common purpose to improve medical disaster response capabilities. 
As the HPP dedicated itself to develop coalition functions, program leaders recognized the 
need to expand performance measures.216 These expanded measures, which were 
implemented in 2017, focus more efforts to gather both quantitative and qualitative data, 
which is intended to promote the HPP value for stakeholders. Additionally, the HPP intends 
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to utilize the first year’s data to develop a baseline for future program targets.217 With the 
HPP future guidance and performance measures in mind, the next chapter takes a gap 
analysis approach and reviews the current capabilities and performance measures in an 
effort to identify areas in which healthcare coalitions can be leveraged to pinpoint 
additional information related to surges needed to foster evidence-based policy (EBP) 
decisions and a greater understanding of surge capacity planning variables. Furthermore, 
the next chapter describes recommendations on how to identify the questions and methods 
of utilizing healthcare coalitions to gather the data needed to answer the questions.  
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V. HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM SURGE POLICY 
GAP ANALYSIS  
The previous chapters provided background on the problem area, the status of the 
healthcare system as it relates to daily overcrowding, basic principles involved with 
healthcare surge capacity, and the role of healthcare coalitions as they connect to surge 
planning. This chapter considers the current healthcare coalition guidance and performance 
measures utilizing a gap analysis dedicated to the central questions of this thesis, which is 
identifying the questions related to surge capacity and how coalitions can be leveraged to 
gather data to answer the questions. Specifically, the gap analysis concentrates on questions 
surrounding surge capacity targets and the impact of overcrowding on disaster response 
capabilities.  
A gap analysis is intended to draw attention to the difference between the current 
status of the organization and its operational goals.218 Jeffrey Harrison states, “Knowing 
where to focus efforts improves the efficiency of interventions.”219 Harrison offers three 
questions to ask when performing a gap analysis: 
• What are we trying to accomplish? 
• What changes can we make that will result in improvement? 
• How will we know if a change is improvement?220 
This method suits a policy review that concentrates on identifying policy flaws, as 
it emphasizes a critical review of the surge policy from the various viewpoints of what is 
working, what is not, how it can be improved, and identifying the risks associated with 
keeping the status quo. Furthermore, this method does not force a complete shift or 
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alternative policy; instead, it provides opportunity to improve healthcare coalition policy, 
which is the goal of this thesis.  
A. WHAT ARE HEALTHCARE COALITIONS TRYING TO 
ACCOMPLISH? 
Fundamentally, HCCs exist (and are supported by federal grant dollars) to ensure 
that healthcare organizations work together “to effectively prepare for and respond to 
emergencies that impact the public’s health.”221 Regarding surge capacity, the HPP charges 
HCCs with ensuring the healthcare community is positioned to manage events that exceed 
daily response capacity and overwhelm resources.222 The HPP references the requirement 
for HCC partners to ensure plans are in place to implement contingency and crisis surge 
tactics and increase resilience within the healthcare community. As discussed in previous 
chapters, the guidance and associated performance measures reference a 20% IBA surge 
capacity target.  
B. WHAT CHANGES CAN POLICY MAKERS AND STAKEHOLDERS 
MAKE THAT WILL RESULT IN IMPROVEMENT FOR HEALTHCARE 
COALITIONS? 
HPP leaders and other policymakers should make a focused shift to an EBP. 
Policymakers benefit from utilizing evidence—in addition to considering experience, 
culture and other influencing factors—to support policy development. EBP has its roots in 
evidence-based medicine, which was intended to identify and terminate damaging or 
unsuccessful medical interventions while championing successful ones.223 EBP “helps 
policymakers make better decisions, and achieve better outcomes, by using existing 
evidence more effectively, and undertaking new research evaluation and analysis where 
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knowledge about effective policy initiatives and policy implementation is lacking.”224 With 
EBP, program leaders can more effectively guide program direction and effort, and 
thereby, create program efficiencies.  
While the current U.S. surge policy has proven to be effective in many instances, 
as described in the Boston Marathon bombing example in Chapter III, the basis of the surge 
policy appears to rely primarily on gut instinct and experience instead of also being shaped 
by evidence from national data provided by real events or exercises. The previous chapters 
have highlighted the concerns with this approach. This researcher argues that the only way 
to determine if current surge policy and targets are adequate is to collect the data that will 
provide the evidence needed to support policy decisions.  
HCCs’ new performance measures provide possibilities to gather nationwide data, 
which affords additional opportunities for evidence-based policy-making. The coalition 
surge test as previously described is already designed to gather standardized data on the 
performance of HCCs as they implement surge policy through the evacuation of 20% of 
hospital beds within a 90-minute window. For the first time, this exercise allows 
researchers to compare apples to apples using the same standards and measures. 
Considering that every HCC in the country must complete this exercise and gather the 
required data and that over 5,300 hospitals (85% of the nation’s hospitals) throughout the 
country participate in HCCs, the opportunity proves to be ripe to answer the core research 
question posed by this thesis, does overcrowding impact hospitals’ disaster response 
capabilities.225  
Regarding the impact of overcrowding on surge capacity, ultimately87 this data can 
be utilized to determine if hospitals experiencing crowding at the onset of the CST find 
more challenges in completing the surge test than those who are not. Furthermore, 
additional information can be gathered to test the 20% IBA threshold that has long been 
utilized by the HPP as a planning target. Consequently, the HPP has an opportunity to move 
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towards EBP by making small modifications to the current CST and HCC performance 
measures in an effort to obtain more qualitative and quantitative responses to the surge 
related questions posed in this thesis. This shift to evidence-based surge policy will serve 
to strengthen the HPP and HCCs.  
C. HOW WILL POLICYMAKERS, STAKEHOLDERS, AND HEALTHCARE 
COALITIONS KNOW IF A CHANGE IS IMPROVEMENT? 
The additional evidence gathered should allow policy makers and stakeholders to 
compare data captured from year to year from healthcare coalitions to determine if the 
changes result in improvement to surge planning efforts. Knowing the answer to this 
question will immediately impact recommendations and guidelines for surge planning for 
all entities involved in created surge capacity within a community. Furthermore, the HPP 
can work to gather standardized data points following disaster events in an effort to capture 
consistent metrics related to overcrowding, baseline capacity, and efficacy of surge 
strategies and tactics; to include IBA tactics.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Fundamentally, HCCs ensure that jurisdictional healthcare systems are prepared to 
respond to and manage a surge of patients following disaster events. Utilizing a quality 
improvement approach, such as completing a gap analysis, can enhance today’s surge 
policy by identifying what changes need to be made to current policy that will result in 
improvement. This gap analysis identifies the need for policy makers within the HPP to 
continue to gather appropriate data and expand the implementation of evidence-based 
decisions. The following chapter provides recommendations for an implementation 
strategy that allows an opportunity for stakeholder input, modifications, critical 
assessment, and testing. It also includes a conclusion to the thesis and offers 
recommendations for future research opportunities.  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Captured data points related to surge capacity in the current HCC performance 
measures and in the CST tool include the number of staffed acute care hospital beds within 
the HCC, the number of beds identified as available at receiving facilities during a 90-
minute exercise window, the number of transportation assets identified, and other targets 
as listed in Appendix B. The HPP already requires HCCs and their healthcare organization 
partners to report these data points annually. However, this data set does not answer 
questions related to surge planning fundamentals, such as whether overcrowding impacts 
hospital emergency responses. Consequently, minimally expanding this reporting 
requirement by just a few data points can assist the HPP in answering these surge capacity 
questions with little additional effort on the part of HCC partners. The following two 
sections outline recommendations on how to leverage healthcare coalitions to identify and 
answer supplementary surge strategy questions.  
1. Modify CST Data Collection Tool to Include Additional Data Points 
to Answer Basic Surge Policy Questions 
Considering the focus and scope of this thesis, this author recommends additional 
data points for the Coalition Surge Test tool to consider whether overcrowding and baseline 
capacity impact disaster response capabilities. Specific adjustments are underlined and in 
italics in the sample revised CST tool sections in Figures 7 and 8. The figures are modified 
from the HPP CST Tool, which is included in Appendix B. 
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Figure 7. Sample Revised CST Tool Section for Evacuating 
Facilities226 
 
Figure 8. Sample Revised CST Tool Section for Receiving 
Facilities227 
Figure 7 added data points: 
• Evacuating facility 1, how many total acute care staffed beds do you have? 
• Prior to the start of the exercise, was your hospital required to open any 
surge areas to meet daily demands? 
                                                 
226 Adapted from Public Health Emergency, “Health Care Coalition Surge Test.” 
227 Adapted from Public Health Emergency. 
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• If yes, how many additional patients were you accommodating over 
staffed beds PRIOR to the onset of the exercise? 
Figure 8 added data points: 
• Was surge space and/or staff in use prior to the start of the exercise to 
accommodate daily patients? 
• If yes, was your facility’s bed availability impacted? 
The added data points in bold on both figures offer an opportunity to gather 
information on the evacuating and receiving hospitals’ crowding status at the onset of the 
CST without creating an additional burden on those coalition partners to provide the 
information. In general, hospitals and HCCs consider these added data points prior to 
responding to the coalition surge tool anyway, as they typically have bearing on how the 
hospitals are able to respond. The additional data added in Figure 7 documents the level of 
overcrowding experienced by the receiving hospitals at the onset of the exercise. 
Additionally, the added questions in Figure 8 provide an opportunity to capture qualitative 
data from hospital executives on the effects of crowding at the receiving hospitals.  
Program leaders and policy makers can compare the baseline crowding status data 
for receiving hospitals between healthcare coalitions, while also comparing their ability to 
meet the 20% surge requirements required by the CST. This information, when combined, 
will then be able to document the level, if any, of impact that overcrowding has on surge 
response capabilities.  
2. Pilot the Modified Data Collection Tools in a Single HPP Region 
Given the potential scope of the newly formed measures and tools, this researcher 
recommends taking one year to pilot the changes within a single HPP planning region. The 
HPP regions mirror the DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) planning 
regions. Figure 9 shows the planning regions for the HPP and FEMA. 
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Figure 9. Planning Regions for the HPP and FEMA228 
Piloting the program adjustments in one region provides an opportunity to gather 
feedback from stakeholders and make modifications as necessary before a nationwide 
rollout. Furthermore, a pilot provides analysts a chance to see if the data they receive 
actually allows them to create an evidence-based recommendation on the impact of 
overcrowding and surge response. Questions can be modified if revisions prove necessary.  
B. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH OPTIONS 
Throughout the evolution of this thesis, opportunities for future research have 
arisen. Chapter III poses several questions related to surge capacity planning not included 
in the scope of this thesis and can be explored further. Questions, such as “to what level 
should hospitals maintain a baseline surge capacity,” warrant consideration, as well as what 
type of beds should be considered in forming baseline capacity (e.g., are operating room 
beds considered in the same way as floor beds or critical care beds?) Additional questions 
related to this subject relate to why hospitals do not maintain a daily portion of open beds 
                                                 
228 Source: “FEMA Regional Contacts,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed September 
2, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/fema-regional-contacts. 
61 
for potential surge and what fiscal considerations or incentives should be considered to 
support hospitals to maintain a daily surge capacity. Also, researchers may consider if it is 
even possible in today’s healthcare environment? Related to foundational principles for 
surge planning, this thesis identifies questions, such as what is the difference between a 
“major” and “minor” disaster event. Furthermore, scholars may ask if it those terms can be 
defined in a manner applicable to all hospitals, and if so, how can they be defined in relation 
to hospital size and capability?  
The major limitation to this research includes the narrow scope of the additional 
questions related to overcrowding that HCCs should address. In an effort to make the added 
data collection more palatable and less burdensome for coalition members, this researcher 
recommended intentionally limited-focused data points for the CST. Furthermore, because 
the CST focuses solely on an evacuation scenario, the other types of surge questions that 
can potentially be answered during the CST remain limited. For example, the impact of 
overcrowding on a hazardous materials event or an infectious disease outbreak’s surge 
response capability has the potential to be assessed during a CST but neither of those 
scenarios may warrant a hospital evacuation that the currently designed CST requires. 
Consequently, HPP leaders may consider altering the scenario periodically to provide an 
opportunity to gather data on different types of events.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The persistent overcrowding crisis facing the nation has resulted in a healthcare 
system with minimal hospital capacity for disaster response. Consequently, because little 
available capacity exists, it becomes imperative to ensure that today’s surge capacity 
planning principles remain efficacious to ensure that the nation’s hospitals and healthcare 
coalitions can effectively respond to disaster events. This thesis asserts that room for 
improvement exists with the current surge policy, because many of the foundational 
assumptions behind the policy are not evidence-based. It identifies many of the questions 
related to surge and delves into identifying a method for healthcare coalitions to answer 
the questions to allow opportunities for the formation of evidence-based surge policies. 
Specifically, while several surge questions are identified, the scope of this thesis focuses 
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on whether the overcrowding crisis affects surge response and how healthcare coalitions 
can assist in gathering the data to answer the question. The unanswered questions may be 
sources of future research opportunities. 
HPP program leaders should utilize the wealth of resources and expertise within 
the 476 healthcare coalitions across the country, including the 31,000 member 
organizations, to take the opportunity to assess U.S. surge policy critically. These 
stakeholders possess a vested interest in ensuring the best possible policy exists. 
Furthermore, their frontline status in addressing both the overcrowding crisis and surge 
events, affords them the unique viewpoint to identify gaps in the policy and experience to 
suggest potential solutions. Finally, the network of healthcare coalitions and national 
reporting requirements for performance measures provides an opportunity to gather data 
from across the country, in a method already being utilized through the Coalition Surge 
Test tool and related performance measures.  
This information can be used to make informed and EBP decisions related to surge 
capacity planning moving forward. If the data suggests that overcrowding does affect surge 
response, future HPP program guidance can be modified to include recommended 
strategies HCCs can consider to address daily overcrowding issues. For example, HPP 
guidance may suggest that HCCs begin to explore utilizing their pre-existing networks of 
healthcare providers to implement programs, such as mobile integrated health designed to 
keep non-acute patients out of emergency departments and in appropriate levels of care.229 
Conversely, if the data indicates that overcrowding does not affect surge response, then 
HPP leaders can keep the status quo; having confidence in their currently designed policy. 
                                                 
229 Eric Beck et al., Mobile Integrated Healthcare Practice: A Healthcare Delivery Strategy to Improve 
Access, Outcomes, and Value (Mobile Integrated Healthcare Practice, n.p., n.d.), accessed July 10, 2017, 
http://www.mobileintegratedhealthcare.com/Websites/mihc/images/MIHP_whitepaper_FINAL.pdf.  
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APPENDIX A. HPP CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASURE CROSSWALK 
Appendix A is a crosswalk between the HPP Capabilities document and the 2017–
2022 HPP Performance Measures Implementation Guidance (Performance Measures 
Guidance document). It also provides a concise summary of the relevant HCC functional 
expectations and directives. 
Table 1.   Crosswalk of Performance Measures to 2017–2022 Health 
Care Preparedness and Response Capabilities230 
 
                                                 
230 Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017–2022 Hospital 
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APPENDIX B. COALITION SURGE TOOL 
The Coalition Surge Test is a tool designed to help HCCs identify gaps in surge and 
response readiness.231  
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